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Growth and survival of firms Revision notes

Unit 7: The price system and the microeconomy · Chapter 36 · about 12 minutes · written for the 9708 syllabus · last checked 2026-11-14

Why do huge multinationals and tiny family shops exist side by side? Why do firms merge, and should governments let them? This topic is about how firms grow and what that means for consumers. It links closely to economies of scale and to market structures, and Paper 4 essays on mergers are common.

Why firms are different sizes

Most businesses in every country are small: usually well over 90% of firms. How a firm’s size is measured matters too: by number of employees, sales revenue, market share, or capital employed (the money invested in the business). A firm has grown if the capital it uses has increased, not just because its sales or profits rose one year.

Why many firms stay small

  • The market is small. A village shop, a local plumber or a specialist repair service only has a limited number of customers.
  • Personal service. Customers will pay more for the attention of a small business: hairdressers, lawyers, tutors, family restaurants.
  • Niche and differentiated products. Small firms can survive next to giants by offering something different, such as handmade, specialist or local products.
  • Low minimum efficient scale. In many service industries, average costs stop falling at a small output, so being big brings little cost advantage.
  • Flexibility. Small firms can adapt quickly to changing tastes.
  • The owner’s choice. Many owners don’t want the risk, stress or loss of control that comes with growth.
  • Obstacles to growth. Banks see small firms as risky, so borrowing is hard and expensive.
  • Support and technology. Governments often help small firms because they create jobs; and the internet lets a small firm reach customers worldwide cheaply.

Why firms grow

  • To gain economies of scale and lower average costs, so they can cut prices or earn more profit.
  • To gain market share and market power, which allows higher prices and protects them from rivals.
  • To spread risk by selling different products in different markets.
  • To gain economies of scope: cost savings from producing a range of products together, for example using the same factory, brand or delivery network for several products.
  • Because managers may want to run a bigger firm for its status, salary and power (see the principal–agent problem below).

Economies of scope are about the range of products a firm makes. Economies of scale are about how much it makes. Don’t mix them up.

Internal and external growth

Internal (organic) growth: a firm grows by expanding its own operations, such as building new factories, opening new branches or launching new products, usually funded by its own retained profits.

External growth: a firm grows by joining with other firms, through a merger (two firms agree to combine into one) or a takeover / acquisition (one firm buys enough shares to control another).

Internal growthExternal growth
SpeedSlowFast: it buys an existing business, customers and brand
RiskLower: the firm grows at a pace it can manageHigher: it may overpay, and the two businesses may not fit together
ManagementKeeps the same culture and controlClashes between the two firms’ cultures and systems are common
CompetitionAdds capacity to the marketRemoves a competitor, so it may be investigated by competition authorities

Growth through diversification means moving into new and different products or markets, either by developing them or by buying firms that already make them. Large diversified groups like the Tata Group in India (steel, cars, tea, hotels and more) are called conglomerates.

Integration

Integration means two firms joining together. The type depends on where the two firms sit in the supply chain.

Types of integration for a chocolate maker: backward vertical into cocoa farming, forward vertical into retail, horizontal with a rival chocolate maker, and conglomerate into an unrelated hotel business Cocoa farm raw materials Chocolate factory our firm Sweet shops retail Rival chocolate maker same stage Hotel chain unrelated industry backward vertical forward vertical horizontal conglomerate
The four types of integration, seen from a chocolate manufacturer.

Horizontal integration

Horizontal integration: joining with a firm at the same stage of production in the same industry, such as two airlines, two banks, or two chocolate makers.

  • Reasons: economies of scale (combining factories, marketing and research), a bigger market share, removing a competitor, gaining access to new markets or brands.
  • Consequences: lower costs, possibly passed on as lower prices; but also more market power, which may mean higher prices and less choice. This is the type most likely to be blocked by competition authorities.

Vertical integration

Vertical integration: joining with a firm at a different stage of the same supply chain.

Backward: towards the raw materials (a chocolate maker buying a cocoa farm).

Forward: towards the customer (a car maker buying car dealerships).

  • Backward, reasons: secure supplies, control their quality, and cut out the supplier’s profit margin.
  • Forward, reasons: guaranteed outlets for its products, control over how they are sold and priced, and keeping the retailer’s profit margin.
  • Consequences: lower costs and better coordination; but it can also be used to block rivals, for example by refusing to supply them with materials or shop space, which raises barriers to entry. It also means managing very different kinds of business.

Conglomerate integration

Conglomerate (lateral) integration: joining with a firm in an unrelated industry.

  • Reasons: mainly to spread risk: losses in one business can be covered by profits in another. It also lets the firm use spare cash and management skills.
  • Consequences: few economies of scale, because the businesses have little in common; and the group can be hard to manage well. Sometimes a struggling conglomerate is broken up and its parts sold off, because the parts are worth more separately than together.

Remember: horizontal = across (same stage), vertical = up and down the supply chain, conglomerate = unrelated. A Chinese restaurant buying a Thai restaurant is horizontal; a car manufacturer buying a car dealership is forward vertical; a coffee company buying a coffee plantation is backward vertical.

Are mergers good for consumers?

This is the core of most Paper 4 questions on this topic. A merger between two large firms in the same industry has two opposite effects: it gives the merged firm more market power, but it can also lower its costs.

Against the merger:

  • Less competition: the merged firm can behave more like a monopoly, charging a higher price for a lower output, with less choice for consumers.
  • The merged firm may become complacent: costs can rise again (X-inefficiency) and service can get worse.
  • It may use its size to keep new rivals out.
  • Jobs may be lost as the two firms close duplicated offices and factories.

For the merger:

  • Economies of scale lower costs. If the cost savings are big enough, the price could even fall below the old price.
  • Bigger profits can fund research and new products (dynamic efficiency).
  • A bigger firm may be needed to compete with large foreign rivals in global markets.
  • It may rescue a failing firm, protecting jobs that would otherwise be lost.

So whether a merger helps or harms consumers depends on how big the cost savings are compared with the increase in market power, whether the savings are passed on, how much competition is left (including from imports and possible new entrants), and whether a regulator watches the merged firm. That is why most countries have competition authorities that study each large merger case by case rather than banning or allowing them all.

Cartels

Cartel: a formal agreement between independent firms to limit competition, usually by fixing prices or setting output quotas for each member, so that together they act like a monopoly.

The best-known example is OPEC, a group of oil-exporting countries that sets production limits for its members to influence the world oil price. Cartels between private firms are illegal in most countries, including the USA, the UK and the EU, because they work against consumers.

Conditions for an effective cartel

  • Few members, so agreement is easier to reach and cheating is easier to spot.
  • High barriers to entry, so outsiders can’t enter and undercut the cartel’s high price.
  • Similar costs and similar products, so members can agree on one price.
  • Inelastic demand, so raising the price increases revenue.
  • Members control most of the market, with few non-members selling the same product.
  • A way of monitoring and punishing cheating, often helped by one dominant member.
  • No effective law against it, or members can hide it.

Consequences

  • For consumers: higher prices, lower output, less choice, and a deadweight loss, just like a monopoly.
  • For members: higher, more stable profits, at least while the cartel holds together.
  • Cartels tend to break down. Each member has an incentive to cheat by secretly producing more than its quota and selling it at the high cartel price. If several do this, the price collapses. Changes in demand, new suppliers outside the cartel (such as US shale oil for OPEC) and new technology (such as electric cars) also weaken them.

A past question asked for the difference between integration and a cartel. Integration means the firms actually become one firm under one owner. In a cartel the firms stay separate and independent but agree to act together, which is collusion. Both can be used to gain market power; integration can also bring economies of scale, which a cartel usually doesn’t.

The principal–agent problem

Principal–agent problem: when one person (the agent) makes decisions on behalf of another (the principal), but has different goals and more information, so may act in their own interest instead.

In a small firm, the owner usually runs the business, so there is no problem. In a large public company, the owners are thousands of shareholders (the principals), but the business is run by managers (the agents). This is called the divorce of ownership and control.

  • Shareholders usually want maximum profit and a rising share price.
  • Managers may prefer to make the firm bigger (more status and higher pay), to maximise sales, to enjoy perks like expensive offices, or to avoid risky decisions that could cost them their jobs.
  • Shareholders can’t see everything managers do, and know much less about the business. This is asymmetric information, and once managers are in post there is moral hazard.

This helps explain why some firms grow through mergers that don’t actually raise profits. Ways to reduce the problem include paying managers partly in shares or bonuses linked to profit, independent non-executive directors to monitor managers, shareholders voting at meetings, and the threat of a takeover: if managers run the firm badly, its share price falls and another firm may buy it and replace them. The effects on a firm’s objectives are covered in objectives of firms.

Answering the Paper 4 essay

Typical questions: “A government allows the merger of two large firms in the same industry. With the help of a diagram, evaluate the view that this merger should not have been allowed”; “The growth of a firm by takeover is desirable because consumers get lower prices and the firm gets more profit. Evaluate this statement”; or “Explain what determines the size of a firm.”

Plan every long answer in the same five steps, in this order. They match how long answers are marked:

  1. Knowledge: define merger and takeover, the type of integration involved (horizontal, in this case), market power, and economies of scale.
  2. Application: use real examples of the kind of merger in the question: two airlines, two supermarket chains, or two car makers combining, and the motives of the firms involved, such as cost savings, market share or competing with large foreign rivals.
  3. Analysis: analyse the case against with a diagram: draw the merged firm as a monopoly (as in market structures), setting MR = MC and charging a price above MC, so it is allocatively inefficient and may make supernormal profit at consumers’ expense. Then analyse the case for: economies of scale lower costs (show the firm moving down a falling LRAC curve), there are more funds for research, and it can compete better globally.
  4. Evaluation: are the cost savings big enough, and will they be passed on to consumers? Is there still competition from imports or new entrants? Was the merger really about managers’ ambitions (the principal–agent problem) rather than efficiency? Can a regulator control the merged firm’s prices?
  5. Conclusion: for example, the merger should be allowed only if the cost savings clearly outweigh the loss of competition, which is why competition authorities judge each case on its own facts.

“Mergers always mean lower prices” and “mergers are always against the public interest” are both too strong. Strong answers show both effects and explain what the outcome depends on.

Check yourself

A car manufacturer buys a chain of car dealerships. What type of integration is this?

Forward vertical integration: the manufacturer is moving closer to the final customer in its own supply chain.

Give two reasons why small firms survive alongside large ones.

Any two of: they serve small or local markets; they offer personal service; they supply niche or differentiated products; the minimum efficient scale in their industry is low; they are flexible; the owner may not want to grow.

What is the main reason for conglomerate integration?

To spread risk across unrelated markets, so a fall in demand in one doesn’t threaten the whole business.

Why do cartels tend to break down?

Each member can earn more by secretly cheating, producing more than its quota and selling at the high agreed price. If members cheat, supply rises and the price falls. New producers outside the cartel and falling demand weaken it further.

Why are small firms less likely to suffer from the principal–agent problem?

In most small firms the owner makes the decisions, so the owner and the decision-maker are the same person and there is no conflict of interest.

Now practise it

Try the 55 past paper questions on Growth and survival of firms, with mark schemes. Start with the most recent ones; if one goes wrong, come back to the section above that covers it.

Practise Growth and survival of firms questions →